518 cepts) on the one hand, and behavioural disturbances (in the control of applying concepts) on the other, in Parkinsonian patients.
For this experiment we devised a new concept/ reasoning task called the Odd-Man-Out test (OMO) derived from animal learning-set studies.3545 In the OMO test subjects are required to indicate which of a set of letters or numbers is different from the others on two series of cards, using two rules of classification alternately on successive trials. The number of correct choices on each trial, and the kind of errors made, indicate the ability of subjects (a) to apply a concept consistently, and (b) to alternate between one response set and another.
Previous studies of concept formation have used the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST),2627 but there are a number of contraindications for its use in Parkinsonism. Firstly, its originators46 noted that normal elderly subjects nearly all failed to progress beyond the first category of sorting in the WCST, and showed perseveration. As our patients were all middle-aged to elderly, it was doubtful whether we could impute any impairments of this kind specifically to Parkinson's disease with the WCST. Secondly, pilot studies suggested to us that our subjects, far from failing to form concepts or to test them reasonably, often adopted elaborate categorisation hypotheses which were difficult to disprove with the WCST procedure, even in its clearer revised version. 47 Interpretation of their failure to perform correctly, therefore, was problematical. Thirdly, there was no indication on the WCST procedure as to how quickly subjects learnt the initial concept, nor how many errors were made during that initial learning. Bowen27 40 mentioned in passing that some Parkinsonian subjects failed to learn the first rule at all. These objections were found not to apply to the OMO test.
Experiment 1
Method Subjects Parkinsonian subjects were from the neurological wards and outpatient clinics of Hull Royal Infirmary. Of 75 patients diagnosed as suffering from the disease, 11 had other disabling illnesses or handicaps as well, 11 could not be tested for practical reasons and four refused to co-operate. This left 49 patients, 28 men and 21 women. Their ages ranged from 37 to 83 years (mean 63-9, SD 9-2 years). One male patient had had a right-sided stereotaxic operation ten years previously, and one female patient had had operations eleven and fifteen years ago, on the left and right thalamus respectively. Every patient was rated independently by a doctor at 6-monthly intervals on the Webster scale of symptom severity and clinical disability. 48 OMO test scores, which were usually obtained in the week following an assessment, were correlated with the most Flowers, Robertson recent Webster rating (range 5-20 in different patients from a total scale of 0-30). Although most patients reported 'good" and "bad" days and some within-day fluctuation in their symptoms subjectively, only one showed an overt on-off syndrome and there were only gradual changes in the Webster scores over the 6-month periods. As far as possible subjects were tested at the best time of a good day to obtain their optimum performance and to minimise the effects of any fluctuation in severity of the disease. Patients were also ranked in terms of duration of the disease, estimated from the date reported in the history when they noticed their first symptom. Duration ranged from 1 to 33 years.
Patients received one or more of the following groups of drugs: anti-cholinergics (15 patients); levodopa plus a dopa-decarboxylase inhibitor (Sinemet, Madopar: 31 patients); amantadine (10 patients); and bromocriptine (four patients). The same and the third different, and one of the two similar shapes/letters differed in size from the other two symbols (see fig 1) . On half the cards in each pack the odd-man-out for size was a large item, and on half it was a small one. For the shape/letter comparison four pairs of shapes and letters were used, each item appearing once in its larger and once in its smaller form as the odd-man-out in one pack, and as the matched pair twice in the other pack. For each choice, therefore, subjects had to respond not to the items themselves, nor to the shapes/letters themselves, but to the overall relationship between the three symbols on the card. The position on the card of the odd-man-out for both shape and size varied from set to set, although they were not entirely evenly distributed between the three positions.
Half the subjects in each group were shown the eight letters cards first followed by the eight shapes cards for both packs, and half shown the shapes first and then the letters. Half the subjects were presented with Pack A first and half with Pack B first. With three items per set, only two errors were possible: choosing the alternative odd-man-out or choosing the common item. Table 3 shows the number of errors of each kind for 41 control and 38 Parkinsonian subjects whose errors were distinguished in the records this way. In both groups most errors fell in the "alternative OMO" category; this is true for errors on trials 1 and 2 also. Overall only four out of 41 control subjects and four out of 38 Parkinsonian subjects made more common-item choices than alternative OMO choices (and these subjects account for almost half the common-item errors.) Thus, although many subjects were inaccurate on these trials, their errors were not mere guesses and only one or two could be regarded as confused, that is, choosing at random.
Discussion
From the results of Trial 1 it seems that Parkinsonian patients are well able to understand and apply a concept in this choice discrimination task, even though their scores are overall slightly lower than those of the controls. But a marked difficulty becomes apparent when the second rule is introduced. Then they start to make errors in classification, mostly by reverting to the alternative rule. Although their scores are still well above chance, Parkinsonian patients are more subject to occasional lapses in maintaining a given "set". This applies to later trials with the first rule as well as to those with the second rule, so the effect is not simply perseveration on the first concept. Parkinsonian patients seem less able to maintain one of the possible mental "set&' against the other when both have been brought to their attention, with the result that they tend to oscillate between the two. Although this tendency is found to a small degree in the control group of elderly normal subjects on trials 2 and 3, they improve on later trials. Anecdotal observation of these subjects, and of many undergraduates, suggested that they, too, quite often found themselves about to make the typical Parkinsonian error, but checked themselves before doing so. In other words, the tendency to "flip over" to the competing rule was present in normal subjects, but was spontaneously corrected before the response was made. A pilot experiment showed that undergraduates increased their error rate in this test when the rate of presentation of the cards was increased by urging subjects to respond as quickly as possible. This occurred presumably because subjects were then unable to "double check" their responses and correct them where a reversion of set had occurred. The tendency to oscillate set, therefore, is probably present in all subjects, but normals are able to suppress it to maintain a given criterion against the competition of alternatives. Parkinsonian subjects are less efficient at inhibiting this oscillation; their difficulty increases with the severity of the disease.
The results for Experiment 1 suggested that Parkinson's disease interferes with the ability to maintain one rule against a possible second one. With only three items per choice, however, it is unclear whether the lure of the the alternative item is due to intrusion by a competing set or to some form of distractibility to novelty (that is, subjects are drawn to the stimulus ignored last time.) A second experiment was therefore designed, in which a fourth item was introduced, offering a third possible way to categorise the stimuli. The intention was to see if the presence of an extra irrelevant stimulus affects discrimination performance, for example, by distracting attention or causing confusion. Experiment 2 also gave us the chance to replicate the effect of Experiment 1 with a number of controls: (a) items were rotated systematically in position on the cards, to check for perseveration of errors on individual items or positions in the sequence; (b) letters and shapes were presented in separate tests on different occasions; and (c) every subject was tested for eight trials whatever level of accuracy they reached, and two trials were repeated after the rules had been explained explicitly, to see if practice and repeated testing on the OMO test helped (or possibly hindered) subjects.
Experiment 2
Method Subjects Sixteen idiopathic Parkinsonian subjects were tested, 11 of whom had taken part in Experiment 1. There were nine men and seven women, whose ages ranged from 39- Scores for later trials were combined into a "'firstrule" score (trials 3, 5 and 7 combined) and a "second-rule" score (trials 4, 6 and 8 combined When subjects make errors in Experiment 2, they can choose either the alternative odd-man-out (that is, the one appropriate to the other rule of the two they are using) or the item for the third category, or the common item. The number of errors of each kind made in trials 1, 2, and first-rule and secondrule trials combined are shown for each test in Table  5 . Here the proportion of errors of each kind is about the same in control and patient groups, with alternative OMO errors comprising some 85% or so of the total errors made. Third category errors constitute about 15-20% of errors only, and common items a negligible proportion of the whole. This confirms the results of Experiment 1, that the main effect of Parkinson's disease is to increase the number of errors made by shifting the response set spasmodically during a trial, whichever rule the subject is currently using.
Discussion
As in Experiment 1, the main difficulty shown by Parkinsonian subjects in Experiment 2 was an inability to maintain one response set when two possible response modes had been suggested to them. Their difficulty is not in understanding the relationships involved, since their Parkinsonism did not severely affect the accuracy of initial classification, but only caused interference on later trials (where the clinical severity of the disease correlated with the degree of disruption). Only the much-improved scores of trials 9 and 10 in each experiment support the notion that subjects can apply the rules once they are made explicit, and that therefore it must be in their initial formulation that the Parkinsonian impairment lies. Maybe the immediately preceding emphasis on the rule to be used buttressed the subjects' set for these trials as, in the Weigl test, telling the subject how to change Flowers, Robertson rules helps them to do so.24
Nor is the Parkinsonian deficit due to distractibility or perseveration, for patients did not perseverate on one rule only; they did not get diverted to a third rule; and they did not perseverate on other features of the material either. Rather the difficulty consists of occasional intrusions from the alternative set into whichever is currently being used. Parkinsonian patients seem less able to maintain a set against competing alternatives than normal elderly subjects, and less able to check their responses and inhibit errors before they are made. The effect is spasmodic and likely to occur at any time in the sequence, and shows little improvement despite practice over several trials on a number of sessions.
Our The effect of Parkinson's disease on the ability to maintain a mental set perception or movement directly, but might well contribute to a patient's clumsiness or inappropriateness of movement on tasks requiring complex perceptual-motor co-ordination, as for example in handling machinery or driving, where adaptation to a continuously changing environment is necessary.
Bowen4052 has also attributed low scores on the WMS battery to a failure to maintain or shift sets, which affects all memory modes. Some observations of ours (to be reported) agree with this analysis, noting occasional quirky errors which lower Parkinsonian memory scores without suggesting that they are suffering from typical amnesic impairments.
Rats30 and cats3' 53 with caudate lesions have also been found to have difficulty on alternation tasks which require a repeated shift of response between two manipulanda, (although the most usual symptom found is perseveration on one of them).
In many ways the behavioural changes found in our experiment resemble those described in humans and animals suffering frontal cortical lesions. Although most studies of the WCST in frontal lesions describe their results in terms of perseveration,3454 there is considerable discrepancy between different accounts. In the version of the test most similar to the OMO, Nelson"' characterises frontal function in part as "the inhibition of one mode of response in favour of another when this becomes appropriate", a description which fits closely both our results and Bowen'S.27 Cohen55 has described a frontal disturbance in Necker cube reversal, paralleling that of Talland in Parkinsonian subjects. Other features of frontal performance which we have also found in Parkinsonism include the tendency to fail on a task after reaching a criterion level54 (which we have found here and in other tasks such as recall memory) and failure to check wrong responses before emitting them.3334 Some subjects also showed a form of dissociation between verbal and manual competence,3334 being able to describe the rule required while still applying it haphazardly.
A difficulty in swapping over between two rules of choice has also been noted in frontal monkeys in situations where the stimuli are the same but the rules guiding the required choice are alternated,3544 and here again their difficulty is not due to an inability to form or apply a rule as such, because the animals could discriminate easily using either of two rules, provided only one was required throughout a test session.
All this suggests that the Parkinsonian deficit on the OMO resembles a frontal effect, although it must be admitted that this remains only a plausible hypothesis at the moment, until the OMO is shown to produce similar deficits in frontal cortical patients and not in those suffering posterior lesions. But if this similarity is confirmed, it has two interesting implications: (a) firstly, that Parkinsonism is associated not with a general dementia, but rather with behavioural changes similar to those usually associated with anterior cortical dysfunction. It is arguable whether dementia may start in a similar fashion as here, and that in mild and moderate Parkinsonian cases we are seeing its initial stages. But it is equally arguable that the effect is more specific, and hence that Parkinsonian patients are not to be grouped with Alzheimer's disease. They may be better described in terms of subcortical dementia, limbic system dementia, or frontal disorder. Further studies of the cognitive capacity of these patients is required to distinguish between these possibilities. Certainly it seems unlikely that mild and moderate cases, at least, are demented. (b) secondly, the "flow-diagram" of basal ganglia connections has until recently indicated that these structures take their input from higher cortical levels of the CNS and send their output to the motor system (motor cortex and spinal cord). On this model, a malfunction in the basal ganglia should not affect the generation of ideas, but may interfere with the formulation of motor "programs" to execute them efficiently-as is often the case when subjects say "My hands won't do what I tell them to". The OMO results, however, suggest that Parkinsonism may also impair the organisation of actions at a higher level, that is, in the decision-making or planning level of skill, as has been found in a number of studies of voluntary movement.5658 If so, it may be that the projection upwards from the basal ganglia to the higher levels of the central nervous system described recently26 59 is functionally as important as the downward one, or that the frontal cortex and caudate system are so interconnected that they must be regarded as an integrated unit such that disruption at any point in the circuit impairs the function of the whole.
Seen in this light, the widespread effects of Parkinson's disease are not surprising, and, although restricted to certain characteristics of behaviour, will affect the whole of a patient's activities. Akinesia then becomes a general mental symptom, not just a restriction in movement of the limbs. It naturally follows that akinesia will be the major handicapping symptom in Parkinsonism, and that the degree of severity of the disease correlates with disruption of set in the OMO task. With a more accurate measure of bradykinesia the correlation with this kind of behavioural symptom should be closer. This work was supported by grants from the Yorkshire Regional Health Authority and the Parkinson's Disease Society of Great Britain. We are
